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Abstract 
We reply to Artiga and Martinez’s claim according to which the organizational account of 
cross-generation functions implies a backward looking interpretation of etiology, just as 
standard etiological theories of function do. We argue that Artiga and Martinez’s claim stems 
from a fundamental misunderstanding about the notion of “closure”, on which the 
organizational account relies. In particular, they incorrectly assume that the system, which is 
relevant for ascribing cross-generation organizational function, is the lineage. In contrast, we 
recall that organizational closure refers to a relational description of a network of mutual 
dependencies, abstracted from time, in which production relations are irrelevant. From an 
organizational perspective, ascribing a function to an entity means locating it in the abstract 
system that realizes closure. In particular, the position of each entity within the relational 
system conveys an etiological explanation of its existence, because of its dependence on the 
effects exerted by other entities subject to closure. Because of the abstract relational nature of 
closure, we maintain that the organizational account of functions does not endorse a 
backward looking interpretation of etiology. As a consequence, it does not fall prey of 
epiphenomenalism. 
 
Keywords 
Biological functions, Organization, Closure, Etiology, Epiphenomenalism 
 
 2 
It is always an honor when some colleagues show interest in your work and make the effort 
to critically appraise and improve your ideas. In “The Organizational Account of Functions is 
an Etiological Account of Functions” Artiga and Martinez analyze the organizational account 
of the notion of biological function (introduced mainly in Mossio et al. 2009 and Saborido et 
al. 2011, and partly enriched in Moreno & Mossio 2015), according to which a biological 
trait is functional if and only if it is subject to organizational closure in the system to which it 
belongs.  
Artiga and Martinez’ analysis primarily focuses on cross-generation functions, and leads to 
the conclusion that the organizational account (OA) does not convey any clear substantive 
advantage over the classical etiological approaches, such as Millikan’s (1989), Neander’s 
(1991) or Godfrey-Smith's (1987). In their opinion, the OA simply consists in another 
etiological definition of function which is even “less appealing than other etiological 
alternatives” (Artiga & Martinez 2016, p. 116). Since the OA aims at overcoming some of 
the central weaknesses of classical etiological accounts, this is indeed a strong criticism, 
which calls for a reply.  
1. What is the criticism about?  
Let us begin by pointing out that there is no debate or disagreement on whether the OA 
possesses an etiological dimension. Indeed, we have explicitly claimed in previous writings 
that the OA is an etiological account, insofar as it constitutes an interpretation of Wright’s 
original definition, according to which: 
“The function of X is Z means: 
(1) X is there because it does Z; 
(2) Z is a consequence (or result) of X’s being there” (Wright 1973 p. 48). 
In contrast, we have argued that the OA presents some notable advantages over classical 
etiological accounts, because it integrates central insights of the systemic-dispositional 
theories of functions (Saborido 2014).  
According to the OA, a function is a contribution of a biological trait to the maintenance of 
the whole organization that, in turn, contributes to maintain the trait itself (see below for 
more details). Accordingly, the OA puts emphasis on two features of biological functions. On 
the one hand, functions are dispositions of parts that contribute to a systemic capacity. In this 
respect, the OA involves a “systemic stance” on functional ascriptions, in line with the ideas 
put forward by dispositional theorists such as Cummins (1975) and Davies (2001). On the 
other hand, however, not any disposition is functional: functions can be ascribed only to 
those effects that, by contributing to the maintenance of the overall organization, etiologically 
determine the conditions of existence of function bearers. Organizational functions are 
therefore both dispositional and etiological. 
In order to keep together (current) dispositions and etiology, the OA relies on the 
characterization of a regime of mutual dependence (that we label “closure”) between the 
constitutive parts of biological systems. Accordingly, we have argued that the OA provides a 
definition of function that, while being etiological, does not fall into one of the most 
problematic aspects of many etiological accounts, i.e. its epiphenomenal character. In 
particular, we have argued that:   
The crucial drawback of the [classical etiological] theories’ explanatory line is the 
implication that functional attributions have no relation to the current contribution of the 
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trait to the system, since they point solely to the selective history of the trait. This 
implication is problematic because it is at odds with the fact that functional attributions to 
biological structures do seem to have some relation—captured by the dispositional 
approaches—to what they currently do, and not only to what explains their current 
existence. Accordingly, [these] theories provide an account that is problematically 
epiphenomenal, in the sense that it maintains that the attribution of a function does not 
provide information about the ‘phenomenon’ (the current system) being observed. From 
this perspective, a function does not describe anything about the current organization of 
the system being analyzed. (Mossio et al. 2009, p. 821)  
In contrast with other etiological accounts, which put forward an understanding of etiology 
by appealing to natural selection, the OA grounds etiology within the organization of each 
individual organism. Therefore, we have argued, the OA avoids epiphenomenalism.  
In their paper, however, Artiga and Martinez contend that the OA does carry on an 
epiphenomenal way of thinking functions. In spite of our intentions, they argue, the OA 
involves a backward looking interpretation of etiology, which makes the OA a version of the 
Selected Effects accounts of function, such as those proposed by Millikan and Neander:  
“the organizational account defended by Mossio and colleagues is, at bottom, a 
deployment of the distinctly historical kind of etiological insight that informs many of 
the best known extant accounts of function” (Artiga & Martinez, 2016, p. 116).  
Artiga and Martinez argue that the epiphenomenal character of OA is especially clear in the 
way it deals with cross-generation functions. 
In Saborido et al. (2011), indeed, we have addressed the seemingly problematic case of those 
functional traits that overcome the limits of individual organisms. In particular, we have 
proposed an organizational interpretation of functions ascribed to cross-generation traits, i.e. 
traits (such as, for instance, the semen and the ovum) that have functional effects in systems 
different from those that produce them. As a result, there seems to be no single organization 
in which the trait is subject to closure. For instance, the most relevant effect of semen is not a 
contribution to the maintenance of the organism that produces it, but to the production of 
other organisms with a distinct organization (the offspring). That seems to force the 
advocates of the OA to choose between two quite unsatisfactory options: either they concede 
that cross-generation traits are not functional from an organizational perspective, or they 
embrace a “splitting account” – in the sense of Delancey (2006) – according to which there 
would be two different definitions of function, one for intra-organismic traits and other one 
for cross-generational ones.  
In Saborido et al. (2011) we have argued that it is possible to maintain a unitary 
organizational account, which applies to both intra- and cross-generation functions. Our 
proposal relies on the idea that cross-generation functions are subject to organizational 
closure just as intra-organismal ones; yet, the system that realizes the relevant closure goes 
beyond the boundaries of individual organisms. More precisely, we have proposed to focus 
on what we label an organizationally closed “encompassing system” that would notably 
include the reproducer and the reproduced organism: 
“If, in a relevant sense, a given system or a given temporal instance of a system possesses 
a constitutive organization because of its causal and material connection with a previous 
instance possessing the same organization, then it can be claimed that the two systems or 
the two instances are in fact instances of the same encompassing organization. In 
particular, the same is also true if the transmitted organization is a self-maintaining 
organization. [...] Since the encompassing system composed by the producer and 
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reproduced organism possesses a (temporally wider) self-maintaining organization, 
reproductive traits are subject to organizational closure, and their functions are correctly 
grounded in the organizational account”. (Saborido et al. 2011, p. 599-600)  
Artiga and Martinez’ main criticism is that the organizational account of cross-generation 
functions is problematic because it implies a backward looking interpretation of etiology. 
According to them, the “encompassing system” invoked by the OA to ground cross-
generation functions corresponds to the notion of lineage, which is nothing but a temporal 
succession of organisms, and not an actual (organized) system itself. Because of this, the 
charge of epiphenomenalism that we address to other etiological accounts equally applies to 
ours. They unfold their argument by discussing how the OA would ground (in their view) the 
cross-generation function of donkey semen:  
“Function Grounding OA: 
(C1) Donkey semen has contributed to the maintenance of the organization of a donkey 
lineage (by aiding donkey reproduction across generations); 
(C2) Semen is maintained and produced by this organization (say, its way of being a 
lineage, in which some individuals are parents or offspring of others); 
That is, the fact that warrants our attribution of function to a cross-generational trait such 
as semen is that semen has contributed to donkey reproduction in the past (C1) and this, in 
turn, explains that semen exists (C2). This is exactly the kind of function-endowing fact 
that etiological theories of biological function postulate” (Artiga & Martinez, 2016, p. 
112) 
If their argument were correct, they would be right in claiming the OA is not clearly 
innovative with respect to other etiological accounts, at least with regards to cross-generation 
functions. In particular, it would suffer from the same problem of epiphenomenalism.  
Yet, we think that their entire argument is undermined by an incorrect interpretation of some 
of the central tenets of the organizational account. In particular, they do not correctly 
understand what the pivotal notion of organizational closure is about. In the following 
section, we explain in some details what the misinterpretation consists in. It is worth noting 
that we do not introduce new ideas in this paper, but we rather elaborate on those already 
exposed in the papers examined by Artiga and Martinez. Yet, the very fact that Artiga and 
Martinez formulated their criticism suggests that some aspects of the OA may require a 
clearer formulation. This is what we aim at in the following sections. 
2. What is organizational closure? 
Let us recall the organizational definition of biological functions, which implies the 
fulfillment of three different conditions. According to the OA, a trait T has (or serves) a 
function F within the organization O of a system S if and only if1:  
C1. T exerts a constraint that contributes to the maintenance of O of S;  
C2. T is maintained under some constraints exerted by O;  
C3. S realizes organizational closure.  
                                                            
1 This definition comes from Moreno & Mossio (2015) and slightly amends that provided in Saborido et al., 
(2011). In particular, it makes explicit that functions are to be conceived of as constraints exerted on processes 
and reactions. See below for more.  
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As C3 illustrates, the idea of organizational closure plays a crucial role. In a nutshell, closure  
“designates a feature of biological systems by virtue of which their constitutive 
components and operations depend on each other for their production and 
maintenance and, moreover, collectively contribute to determining the conditions 
under which the system itself can exist” (Moreno & Mossio 2015: p. 36, see also 
Mossio 2013).  
In particular, we have recently put forward a more formal characterization (Montévil & 
Mossio, 2015), which describes closure as the mutual dependence among a set of entities 
acting as constraints on the thermodynamic flow of energy and matter (processes and 
reactions) traversing the system. Organizational closure should therefore be understood as a 
“closure of constraints”: what is “organized” in biology, we hold, are the constraints that 
constitute the system and control its dynamics.  
Leaving aside technical details, which are not relevant here, it seems that Artiga and Martinez 
have difficulties in getting a clear understanding of the very notion of closure and, more 
precisely, of its theoretical nature. When discussing how the OA ascribes cross-generation 
functions, they note: 
“the idea [of OA] is that there is, after all, an organization that underpins the attribution of 
function to cross-generational traits: the ‘‘encompassing system’’ which includes (at least) 
the system that carries the trait and its offspring in the following generation. To a first 
approximation, then, an encompassing system includes a set of organisms of different 
generations of a single lineage”. (Artiga and Martinez, 2016, p.110) 
So far so good. Troubles begin when Artiga and Martinez interpret the “includes” above as 
the idea that the encompassing system is the (relevant fraction of the) lineage. It is true, as 
Artiga and Martinez remind, that we pointed out the following in our 2011 paper:  
“The crucial point is that the organization of the system constituted by the conjunction 
of the reproducing and reproduced organisms (in this specific case, a minimal lineage 
with two elements) has exactly the same status, in terms of self-maintenance, as that 
of the individual organisms” (Saborido et al. 2011 p. 600).  
This sentence might appear ambiguous at first sight. However, it by no means implies the 
idea that the encompassing organized system is equivalent to the lineage. It rather means that 
the encompassing organized system can be described by considering jointly a set of 
organisms, which in other respects constitute a lineage. Yet, the kind of relations among 
these organisms that matters for describing the two systems (the organized system vs. the 
lineage) is distinct.  
To better understand this fundamental point, let us focus on closure as a general notion. 
Organizational closure consists in a regime in which a set of entities (acting as constraints) 
realizes a mutual dependence, such that the conditions of existence of each of them depend 
(at least in part) on the effects produced by (at least) one other constraint included in the set. 
Therefore, closure implies a circular relation between the mutually dependent constraints; as 
such, we submit, it can only be described by abstracting from the physical time. As a circular 
regime, indeed, closure cannot unfold in time and requires an abstract relational description.  
To see why, consider the mutual dependence between the heart and the lungs in a mammal 
(both the heart and the lungs complying, by hypothesis, with our characterization of a 
constraint): the heart depends on the lungs and, reciprocally, the lungs depend on the heart. 
How is this mutual dependence realized in the physical world? In a real organism, we would 
observe a chain of dependences unfolding in time: for instance, the heart would contribute at 
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time t1 to maintaining the lungs, which would contribute at t2 to maintaining the heart, which 
would contribute to maintaining the lungs at time t3 and so on2. To interpret such a linear 
succession of events as a closed regime, an additional theoretical move is required. In 
particular, we must make the hypothesis that, for instance, the heart at t1 and t3 is, in some 
relevant sense, the same heart. If so, we could conclude that the heart maintains the lungs 
and, reciprocally, that the lungs maintain the (same) heart: as a result we obtain mutual 
dependence between them, and both the heart and the lungs become functional, according to 
the organizational account. Now, on what ground can we posit that two temporal instances of 
the heart are actually the same heart? One good reason could the fact that many similarities 
exist between the description of the heart as a constraint at t1 and t3, as well as the kind of 
dependence that it has with the lungs at t1 and t3. In any case, we submit that the identification 
cannot mean that the heart at t3 is the same temporal instance than the heart at t1 because this 
would imply that the chain of dependences has gone back in time. In this respect, the 
background assumption is that a scientifically acceptable characterisation of a physical 
circular regime should not reverse the “arrow of time”. 
As a consequence, the very idea of closure makes sense only by identifying similar patterns 
in the chain of constraint dependences through time, and by identifying these patterns as the 
same by neglecting the fact that they occurred in different moments. For this reason, we 
claim that the description of closure requires abstracting from the flow of time. In the 
simplified example above, for instance, the mutual dependence between the lungs and the 
heart (the heart depends on the lungs and vice-versa) does not make any reference to the 
temporal unfolding of the constraints exerted by each entity. What matters is only their 
abstract relational dependence, while time is neglected for theoretical reasons that pertain to 
the scientific understanding of circularities: there cannot be circular regimes in the physical 
time. 
The very same theoretical approach applies to cross- generation organizations. To describe 
them, the OA takes into account a chain of constraint dependences that unfolds in time 
beyond the boundaries of a single generation. In the chain, the iteration of similar patterns 
can be identified across generation, as for instance the fact that the constraint exerted by the 
heart in a mammal, as well as the way in which it maintains the lungs, is very similar in the 
offspring and parents. The same reasoning can of course be applied to many other constraints 
at work in the organisms. Consequently, one can conclude that a set of constraints realizes a 
closure, an “encompassing” self-maintaining organization.  
Crucially, the fact that from the very same chain of dependences one could also describe a 
succession of distinct organisms linked by a production relation is totally irrelevant here: 
their being a sequence of reproducers and reproduced systems, which eventually generates a 
lineage, plays no role in ascribing cross-generation functions from an organizational 
perspective. In the encompassing organization, there are neither reproducers nor reproduced 
systems: there is only one self-maintaining organization that maintains (what could in other 
respects be called cross-generation) functions (for example, the functions of the sperm and 
the ovum) and is maintained by them – just as any individual organism maintains its 
functional constraints and is maintained by them. What matters for describing the 
encompassing self-maintaining organization is the continuity of constraints dependences and 
the iteration of similar patters which allow folding up the chain, while the discontinuity 
which is relevant for describing the production relation among them (the reproduction) does 
not. As a consequence, we maintain that the encompassing self-maintaining system invoked 
                                                            
2 This is of course a simplification of the real situation. Among other things, there may be a partial overlap 
between the time scales t1 t2 and t3.  
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by the OA is not an abstraction of biological kinships such as species or lineages. On the 
contrary, it is characterized by the fact of instantiating organizational closure just as 
individual biological organisms do (although this does not imply that these encompassing 
systems are organisms themselves)3.   
The difficulty to adequately understanding what organizational closure is about has induced 
Artiga and Martinez’ incorrect interpretation of the encompassing organization as a lineage; 
in turn, this misinterpretation has paved the way to their main criticism, the idea that the OA 
endorses a backward looking interpretation of etiology.  
Before answering to their criticism, let us first deal with a specific point that Artiga and 
Martinez raise in their paper. The point refers to the “period of time” which is necessary for 
describing closure. According to Artiga and Martinez, “[ascribing an organizational function 
to the donkey semen] can only mean that the semen in question must have contributed to the 
maintenance of the donkey lineage also in earlier generations” (Artiga and Martinez 2016, p. 
112): even in the OA – they submit – traits must produce their effects for a certain period of 
time to acquire a functions.  
In the OA, however, this does mean something else. To ascribe functions, the OA must first 
describe the organizational closure of the organism under scrutiny, which in turn requires 
picking up the relevant constraints. Now, as discussed above, biological constraints and their 
dependences unfold in time. Accordingly, the period of time evoked by Artiga and Martinez 
is the time duration that must be considered for observing the relevant portion of the chain of 
constraint dependences, and the iteration of similarities. In our toy example above, the chain 
of dependences must unfold at least until t3, when an iteration of the dependence between the 
heart and the lungs, similar to that observed at t1, occurs. Once that that duration has elapsed, 
and the constraints have been exerted, their mutual dependencies and overall closure can be 
described by abstracting them from physical time, as recalled above. Therefore, and in sharp 
contrast to Artiga and Martinez’ claim, some time is required for describing closure, but not 
for ascribing functions. Once closure is described, functions are ipso facto ascribed to all 
organized constraints, with no consideration for the fact that functions might or not have been 
performed for a short or long time, or in earlier generations.  
Let us also emphasize that when we claim that functional traits must be produced and 
maintained by the system we simply mean that they must exist and last long enough to exert 
the constraint: an enzyme which would deteriorate too fast would be unable to catalyze 
chemical reactions. But this condition, against what Artiga and Martinez suggest (Artiga and 
Martinez, 2016, p. 111), holds even for possible one-shot functions, i.e. functions performed 
only once in the history of life, and possibly for a very short time. A constraint must exist 
long enough to perform its function, and therefore to be able to produce an effect which 
contributes to the maintenance of the organization and, thereby, of the function bearer. Yet, 
the frequency or duration of functional effects is per se irrelevant. 
In our view, in sum, Artiga and Martinez’ misinterpretation of the very concept of 
organizational closure has generated a systematic bias in their reading and understanding of 
the organizational account of functions. Let us now come back to their main point: the claim 
that the organizational account of cross-generation functions implies a backward looking 
interpretation of etiology. 
 
                                                            
3 As a matter of fact, the organizational account could possibly be applied to describe other kinds of closed 
organizations that include individual organisms (such as social or ecological ones, see for instance Nunes Neto 
et al. 2014), and ascribe functions to their parts. 
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3. Is the organizational account a backward looking one? 
By relying on the clarifications provided in the previous section, we reply to Artiga and 
Martinez’ main criticism by firmly maintaining that the OA does not imply per se a temporal 
interpretation of the etiological dimension, and in particular not a backward looking one.  
The OA ascribe functions to constraints subject to organizational closure that, as discussed, is 
described by abstracting from time the relevant set of mutual dependencies. Because of the 
very nature of organizational closure as a theoretical construct, hence, functional ascriptions 
have no temporal orientation. From an organizational perspective, ascribing a function to a 
constraint means locating it in an abstract relational system that realizes closure. In 
particular, the position of each constraint within the organization conveys a relational 
explanation of its existence (its maintenance), because of its dependence on the effects 
exerted by other constraints. Accordingly, the etiological dimension of functions consists in 
the fact that organized constraints are not only the origin, but also the target of abstract 
dependence relations in a closed system. As a consequence, for each constraint subject to 
closure, what explain etiologically its maintenance (C2) is not supposed to temporally 
precede its contribution to the maintenance of the system (C1). There is no temporal ordering 
between C1 and C2; they differ uniquely with respect to the orientation of the dependence 
relation (the arrow) in the relational graph. To refer again to our example above, the mutual 
dependence between the heart and the lungs (and more generally between the whole set of 
constraints subject to closure in a mammal) has no temporal orientation as such. In particular, 
what contributes to explain etiologically the maintenance of the heart (here, the constraint 
exerted by the lungs) does not precede or follow its contribution as a constraint. 
Of course, the abstract relational character of organizational functions does not mean that one 
cannot provide a temporal interpretation for each specific situation. Indeed, it might be the 
case that, for a specific constraint, C1 follows temporally C2. Yet, this is just one possibility, 
the other being that C1 temporally precedes C2, in such a way that the maintenance of the 
trait is a potential course of actions to be realized in the future. Just as for Wright’s definition, 
hence, the organizational account supports both backward looking and forward looking 
interpretations of etiology (the latter having been championed, in particular, by Bigelow & 
Pargetter 1987, and Walsh 1996). In fact, the expression “is there” in Wright's formulation 
can be read in a wider sense and it can refer to future (“X will be there”) and even 
counterfactual states (“X would be there”). All these interpretations are compatible with the 
OA. In all cases, again, the temporal ordering is as such irrelevant for functional ascriptions 
from the organizational perspective. 
As a consequence, we do maintain that the OA, insofar as it does not endorse a backward 
looking interpretation of etiology, does not fall prey of epiphenomenalism. Indeed, functions 
are epiphenomenal when they convey an etiological dimension, which refers to some state of 
affairs having occurred in the past. Accordingly, an effect produced by a trait (type) is 
functional if it has contributed to set the conditions of existence of the trait in the past: what 
the trait (token) does here and now is not relevant for function ascriptions.  
In turn, the OA interprets the etiological dimension of functions as the fact of being the target 
of dependence relations in an abstract graph of organizational closure. What explains the 
existence of the function bearer is the relational structure of the organization (and the related 
network of constraints dependencies), which does not involve any temporality. To build such 
a relational structure, the OA does not need to restrict the relevant chains of dependences to 
those having occurred in the past: in particular, there is no reason to exclude the current 
contribution of a trait, insofar as such current contribution can be subject to closure with 
other contributions occurring simultaneously, in the past, or in the future. For instance, one 
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may say that the lungs of a mammal have contributed a second ago to maintaining the heart, 
which contributes now to maintaining the lungs. As above, if we have good reasons to 
identifying the lungs that we observed a second ago with the lungs that we observe now, then 
we can conclude that the current contribution of the heart is subject to organizational closure. 
Since there is no theoretical reason for excluding current effects of traits from the description 
of abstract closure, we hold that, by construction organizational functions are not 
epiphenomenal.  
Let us insist on this: one thing are the conditions in which functions are ascribed, and another 
thing are the conditions in which functions are performed. In an organism, functions are 
performed in time, and their dependencies unfold in time; yet, one of the original insights of 
the OA is that such temporal ordering does not play a role in ascribing biological functions. 
As a consequence, the contribution of a trait to its own existence does not need to precede its 
own existence in time: in particular, one can appeal to the current contribution of a trait to 
account for its own existence. Unfortunately, such a distinction gets lost in Artiga and 
Martinez’s interpretation.  
Lastly, Artiga and Martinez hold that, if the OA were not epiphenomenal it would unable to 
give an account of malfunctions:  
“[OA] be unable to account for malfunction since it would be impossible for a trait to 
have a function and fail to contribute to a system” (Artiga and Martinez, 2016, p. 
113).  
Although we cannot discuss this issue in details here, we would mention that the OA has 
recently started to address the notion of malfunction (Saborido & Moreno 2015). The 
underlying idea is that, in spite to what most advocates of selected effects theories claim, 
there are ways of accounting how a trait can “fail” to perform a function without adopting an 
epiphenomenal stance.  
4. How are organizational functions individuated? 
In the final part of their paper, Artiga and Martinez critically examine how the OA provides 
criteria to individuate functional traits. According to them, the fact that the OA aims at 
ascribing functions to particular traits because of their role in the organized system means 
that the OA is committed to the idea that functions are ascribed to traits tokens and not to trait 
types. Artiga and Martinez argue that this position implies that:  
“the different instances of semen of many individual donkeys constitute the same 
token. That is, the organizational theorist must hold that the semen of a significant set 
of donkeys that belong to different generations are numerically the same semen” 
(Artiga and Martinez 2016, p. 114).  
Indeed, the OA claims that the instances of cross-generation traits are not subject to closure 
within individual organisms at each generation, but only within the encompassing closed 
organization. Therefore, we do submit that these instances are functionally individuated as 
the same trait. Artiga and Martinez conclude:  
“this way of individuating traits is extremely counterintuitive — outlandish, rather” 
(Artiga and Martinez 2016, p. 115). 
Our reply is twofold. On the one hand, we think that the question whether the OA ascribes 
functions to tokens or types is a general one, which applies to both intra- and cross-
generation traits. Indeed, one might wonder whether any intra-generation functional trait is a 
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token or a type (instantiated by several temporal instances), just as Artiga and Martinez 
question whether the semen of the reproducer and the semen of the reproduced donkey are a 
single token or two tokens belonging to the same type. Yet, the answer to that question 
depends on background metaphysical assumptions that seem to us quite irrelevant for the 
purpose of ascribing functions. Whether or not a man’s heart or semen is a token or a type 
might possibly play a role for dealing with biological malfunctions, but not for individuating 
functional traits. The two issues are related but logically distinct: accordingly, we hold that 
the criteria of individuation provided by the OA can be adopted even though the token/type 
issue is not settled and left open. 
On the other hand, we maintain that the OA applies the very same criterion of individuation 
of functional traits both for intra-generation and cross-generation ones. In both cases, 
temporal instances of a trait are taken as instances of the same functional trait (be it a token 
or a type) if they can be integrated into an abstract description of organizational closure. 
Functional identification results from the very theoretical operation of describing closure.  
In Saborido and al. (2011) and Moreno & Mossio (2015) we placed heavy emphasis on the 
fact that the same criterion of individuation applies to both intra-generation and cross-
generation function, the difference being uniquely the relevant regime of closure. In 
particular, we stressed that, for the purpose of ascribing functions, the organizational 
continuity sustained by closure grounds individuation in spite of other discontinuities that 
might exist between the various temporal instances. In the case of cross-generation functions, 
in particular, we wrote: 
“The various temporal instances (at time scales τ1, τ2 …< τn) of a system can be 
considered – in spite of any changes that may occur – instances of the same encompassing 
self-maintaining organisation, to the extent that their constitutive organisation realises 
closure at τn. In particular, this implies that the system in which a trait x performs an 
enabling function at time τ1 is the same system in which, at τ2, that function of x is 
dependent, if both τ1 and τ2 are included in τn (at which closure is realised). In other terms, 
for the purposes of ascribing functions, the continuity of closure (and thus the maintenance 
of the system) takes precedence as a criterion of individuation over other criteria on the 
basis of which the various instances of the organisation would possibly not be taken as 
instances of the same system. If there is a causal dependence between two temporal 
instances of a system, such that their conjunction realises closure, then it could be claimed 
that, in this respect (and possibly only in this respect) the two instances are temporal 
instances of the same encompassing organisation”. (Moreno & Mossio, p. 79) 
This paragraph can be slightly amended in the light of the preceding discussion about the 
notion of closure. In particular, the “causal dependence” which is mentioned can be more 
precisely understood as “constraint dependence”:  if there is a continuous chain of constraint 
dependences, and the iteration of a similar pattern that allows folding it up, then instances of 
the same trait occurring at different generations can be subject to the same closure. 
According to the OA, hence, cross-generation functional traits are individuated for the same 
reasons than functional traits in individual organisms. Therefore, if organizational criteria are 
acceptable and coherent in the latter case (an issue with which we do not deal here), then we 
submit that they apply also to the former case, in spite of the fact they might seem 
counterintuitive.  
OA adopts a criterion of functional identification based on organizational closure, which  
implies a continuity of constraint dependences through time. Although its application might 
be debatable and should of course be the object of accurate philosophical scrutiny, we believe 
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that it constitutes a relevant alternative to evolutionary criteria of functional identification at 
work in selected effects etiological approaches. 
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